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SUMMARY
In Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe a substantial share of bank deposits
are denominated in foreign currency. Deposit euroization poses key challenges for
monetary policy and ﬁnancial sector supervision. On the one hand, it limits the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy interventions. On the other hand, it increases ﬁnancial
sector fragility by exposing banks to currency risk or currency-induced credit risk.
Policymakers disagree on whether countries in the region should tackle deposit euro-
ization with ‘dedollarization’ policies or should rather strive to adopt the Euro as
their legal tender. Assessing the potential effectiveness of ‘dedollarization’ policies re-
quires a clear understanding of which households hold foreign currency deposits and
why they do so. On the basis of survey data covering 16,375 households in ten coun-
tries in 2011 and 2012, we provide a comprehensive household-level analysis of de-
posit euroization in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. We examine how
households’ preferences for, and holding of, foreign currency deposits are related to in-
dividual expectations about monetary conditions and network effects. We also exam-
ine to what extent monetary expectations and deposit euroization are the legacy of
past ﬁnancial crises or the outﬂow of current policies and institutions in the region.
Our ﬁndings suggest that deposit euroization in Central, Eastern and Southeastern
Europe can be partly tackled by prudent monetary and economic decisions by today’s
policymakers. The preferences of households for Euro deposits are partly driven by
their distrust in the stability of their domestic currency, which in turn is related to
their assessment of current policies and institutions. However, our ﬁndings also sug-
gest that a stable monetary policy may not be sufﬁcient to deal with the hysteresis of
deposit euroization across the region. First, we conﬁrm that the holding of foreign
currency deposits has become a ‘habit’ in the region. Second, we ﬁnd that deposit
euroization is still strongly inﬂuenced by households’ experiences of ﬁnancial crises in
the 1990s. Our ﬁndings question the effectiveness of supply side interventions (e.g.
bank regulation) or demand side interventions (e.g. local currency capital market de-
velopment) in de-euroizing household savings. First, we show that deposit euroiza-
tion is largely demand driven. Second, we show that households already have access
to a broad range of savings products in local currency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Policymakers and academics agree that the widespread euroization of bank deposits in
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe constrains domestic monetary policy and
poses a major threat to financial stability (Levy-Yeyati, 2006; Ranciere et al., 2010).
However they disagree on how best to deal with deposit euroization. International finan-
cial institutions, for example the EBRD and the IMF, emphasize the need to
‘dedollarize’ the banking sector (e.g. Nagy et al., 2011). Enhancing the credibility of do-
mestic monetary policy is seen as a key step towards dedollarization (Kokenyne et al.,
2010). Further policy recommendations include the development of local currency capi-
tal markets, or regulatory interventions to discourage the provision of foreign currency
savings and credit products (Hake et al., 2014). By contrast, some policymakers in the
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region view deposit euroization as an inevitable heritage of past financial crises, and
thus recommend a fast adoption of the Euro.
In 2012, more than 75% of bank deposits in Croatia and Serbia and more than 40%
of deposits in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia were
denominated in foreign currency, predominantly the Euro. Figure 1 shows that the
share of foreign currency denominated deposits increased strongly in Southeastern
Europe (e.g. Serbia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria) during the financial crises of the
1990s and has remained high throughout the more recent financial and sovereign crises.
By contrast, the share of foreign currency deposits has declined gradually in Central
Europe (e.g. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic).
What drives these large differences in the euroization of deposits across countries? Are
households’ expectations regarding future monetary conditions the main driver of foreign
currency deposit holdings? If so, are these expectations affected by the recent track-record
of domestic policymakers or are they rooted in historical experiences of banking and cur-
rency crises? To what extent do habit or network effects, which are also possibly rooted
in past financial crises, determine households’ preferences for foreign currency deposits?
In this paper, we use household-level survey data to clarify the drivers of deposit euro-
ization in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and to assess the potential effec-
tiveness of dedollarization policies. We examine how the demand for foreign currency
deposits is related to individual expectations about future monetary conditions as
Figure 1. Deposit substitution in Eastern Europe.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows aggregate shares of deposits in foreign currency (in %) for private households (and
non-proﬁt organizations) in the ten countries covered by the OeNB Euro Survey over the period 1996–2012.
Source: National Central Banks.
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opposed to network effects. Motivated by the recent empirical research on the role of fi-
nancial sophistication and financial decision making, we also examine to what extent fi-
nancial literacy affects the demand for foreign currency deposits across households.
Our analysis is based on a representative household-level data set collected by the
Euro Survey project of the Austrian Central Bank (OeNB). Since 2007 the OeNB has
repeatedly carried out surveys among private individuals to collect information on the
role of the Euro in ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries–the six
new EU member countries Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Czech
Republic as well as the four (potential) EU candidates Albania, Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia. Our analysis focuses on the two surveys from Fall
2011 and Fall 2012 because they provide comprehensive information on the potential
drivers of deposit euroization. Moreover, these two survey waves elicited information on
households’ foreign currency deposit preferences, irrespective of whether they had sav-
ings in a deposit account or not. This information enables us to disentangle demand
from supply effects of deposit euroization. Also, we obtain information on the demand
for foreign currency deposits among the numerous households which have a bank
account, but do not (currently) have savings in a deposit account.
We report five main findings. First, we document that the euroization of deposits in
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe is demand-driven: among households which
have a savings account the share of foreign currency deposits coincides with stated pref-
erences for foreign currency savings. Second, we show that deposit euroization at the
household-level is strongly related to monetary expectations: households which expect a
depreciation of the local currency over the next year or who have little trust in the long-
term stability of the local currency are more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits.
Exchange rate expectations have a stronger impact on deposit substitution in countries
with a pegged currency, likely because any depreciation in these countries would be
severe. Third, we find that network effects strongly affect the preferences of households
for foreign currency deposits: conditional on their monetary expectations, households
which report that foreign currency saving is common in their country are more likely to
prefer foreign currency deposits themselves. Fourth, we show that financially sophisti-
cated households are more likely to base their currency choice on monetary expecta-
tions. Finally, we document that deposit euroization in the region is strongly influenced
both by past financial crises as well as by current policies and institutions. The role of
past versus current policies is surprisingly similar across household cohorts.
Overall, our results suggest that deposit euroization in Central, Eastern and
Southeastern Europe may be partly tackled by a stable monetary regime and sound eco-
nomic policies of today’s policymakers: deposit euroization is related to trust in the sta-
bility of the local currency, which in turn is influenced by households’ assessments of
current policies and institutions. Our results, however, also show that stable monetary
policy is unlikely to be sufficient to deal with the hysteresis of deposit euroization across
the region: we confirm that the holding of foreign currency deposits has become a
‘habit’ and is still strongly influenced by the experience of financial crises in the 1990s.
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Our findings question the effectiveness of policies targeted towards local currency
capital market development as well as bank regulation targeted towards discouraging the
supply of savings products in foreign currency. First, we show that households have ample
access to a broad range of savings products in local and foreign currency. Second, we
show that the deposit euroization is largely demand driven. Thus any policy to discourage
foreign currency deposits may well encourage the use of other foreign currency-denomi-
nated financial assets, like foreign currency cash, rather than local currency bank deposits.
2. DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTION: THEORYAND EVIDENCE
The term dollarization–or in our case euroization–relates to the use of foreign currency
as a medium of payments (currency substitution) and as a medium to store wealth (asset
substitution). In this paper we examine the preferences of households for foreign currency
savings accounts as opposed to local currency savings accounts. We relate this deposit
Box 1. The availability of retail savings products in foreign currency
Retail depositors in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe have broad ac-
cess to savings products in foreign currency. This is revealed by a survey of the
websites of the three major banks (as measured by their number of branches)
for each of the countries covered in our analysis. In all ten countries, major
banks offer current accounts, non-maturing (sight) deposit accounts and term
deposit accounts in foreign currency to their retail customers. Minimum bal-
ances and maturities for foreign currency (and local currency) term deposits
vary across countries and across banks within the same country. For example,
in Bulgaria the three major banks (DSK bank, UniCredit Bulbank and Central
Cooperative Bank) offer foreign currency term deposits from 250, 100 and 50
Euro, respectively. Within each bank, minimum maturities do not differ for lo-
cal currency and foreign currency term deposits but minimum balance require-
ments are typically higher for foreign currency deposits. For example, in May
2014 UniCredit Bulbank (Bulgaria) offered term deposits in Bulgarian Lev
(1.96 BGN¼ 1 EUR) and Euro with maturities from 1 week to 24 months. The
minimum balance for local currency term deposits was 50 Lev compared to a
minimum balance of 100 Euro for foreign currency deposits. The same bank of-
fered their retail customers’ current accounts (from a minimum balance of 50
BGN or 25 Euro) and sight deposits (from a minimum balance of 10 Lev or 50
Euro) in both currencies.1
1 http://www.unicreditbulbank.bg/en/Individual_Clients/Deposits/DepositOnHand/Documents/
index.htm (accessed May 25, 2014).
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substitution primarily to the motive of wealth storage. However, the funds held in foreign
currency savings accounts may also be used directly for payment purposes. Thus in the
following we relate our analysis to the existing literature on both asset substitution and
currency substitution.
2.1. Theory
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) provide a portfolio theory of asset substitution. They propose
that–under the condition that the uncovered interest rate parity holds–risk-averse inves-
tors choose the currency composition of their assets and liabilities so as to minimize the
variance of the real value of their net worth. Higher inflation volatility and lower volatil-
ity of the real exchange rate imply a higher share of foreign currency assets and liabilities
in the minimum variance portfolio (MVP). The portfolio theory thus suggests that de-
posit substitution will increase if households expect higher volatility of domestic inflation
or lower volatility of the real exchange rate. When the uncovered interest parity does not
hold households deviate from the MVP: they increase the share of foreign currency as-
sets and decrease the share of foreign currency liabilities as the real interest rate differen-
tial between the foreign and local currency widens.2 The portfolio theory suggests that
deposit substitution will increase if the expected real interest rate on foreign currency
deposits rises compared to the real interest rate on local currency deposits. Thus–for
given market deposit rates–households which expect higher domestic inflation and/or a
stronger depreciation of the local currency will be more likely to prefer foreign currency
deposits.
Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2006) provide a market failure theory of asset substitution. In their
model a positive correlation between exchange rate risk and default risk encourages
banks to finance themselves with foreign currency deposits. They show that if there is
asymmetric information about their currency exposure and government safety nets
(i.e. deposit insurance) treat foreign currency and local currency deposits equally, deposi-
tors will accept lower real interest rates on foreign currency deposits than on local
currency deposits. In a further model of market failure Ranciere et al. (2010) show
that implicit bail-out guarantees (e.g. the guarantee that the exchange rate of the
local currency will not be allowed to depreciate) give incentives for debtors and creditors
to write debt contracts in foreign currency.3 Such implicit guarantees are likely to be
stronger, the larger the share of domestic borrowers which hold unhedged foreign
currency debt.4 For deposit substitution, the market failure theories suggest a possible
2 See Froot and Thaler (1990) for evidence on deviations from the uncovered interest parity.
3 See also Schneider and Tornell (2004).
4 Recent policy measures to protect foreign currency mortgage borrowers in Hungary provide an example
of implicit bail-out guarantees for foreign currency borrowers. The experience of Latvia during the
2008–9 financial crisis provides an example of how widespread foreign currency borrowing may limit
the ability to devalue the domestic currency.
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role of network effects: households with given expectations regarding monetary condi-
tions will be more likely to choose foreign currency deposits if deposit substitution is
widespread in the economy. This is the case because widespread deposit substitution en-
ables monetary authorities to devalue the local currency without hurting domestic
savers.
Currency substitution theories (e.g. Engineer 2000) suggest that agents choose the foreign
versus local currency as a means of payment by trading off the purchasing power risk
of local currency versus the transaction costs of using foreign currency. In these models
foreign currency is more likely to be used as a medium of exchange if (i) the expected
depreciation of the local currency is high, and (ii) the transaction costs of using foreign
currency (counterfeit risk, currency conversion costs) are low. Craig and Waller (2004)
show that due to network effects the transaction costs of using foreign currency versus
local currency can be endogenous to the level of currency substitution. For deposit sub-
stitution these theories suggest that households that regularly use savings deposits for pay-
ment purposes will be more likely to hold their deposits in foreign currency if expected
inflation and depreciation of the local currency is high and foreign currency is widely
used as a payment medium.
2.2. Evidence
Empirical evidence on the determinants of deposit substitution is scarce and mostly
limited to aggregate data.5 Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) examine aggregate data for 46
low-income, middle-income and upper-income countries for the period 1990–5. They
provide evidence supporting the minimum-variance portfolio theory: the aggregate
share of foreign currency deposits is positively related to inflation volatility and nega-
tively related to real exchange rate volatility (see also Levy-Yeyati, 2006). De Nicolo
et al. (2005) examine a sample of 100 countries for the period 1990–1 and confirm
the impact of inflation and exchange rate volatility on aggregate deposit dollarization.
In addition, they find that higher inflation levels and weak institutions (government effi-
ciency, rule of law, corruption, etc.) are associated with higher levels of dollarization.
Brown et al. (2013a) examine the relation between regional consumer price inflation
5 By contrast, there is now ample research documenting the relevance of foreign currency deposits for for-
eign currency lending and thus for financial sector fragility, specifically in Emerging Europe. Luca and
Petrova (2008) and Basso et al. (2011), examining aggregate credit dollarization for transition countries,
document that countries in which banks have a higher share of foreign currency funding display a higher
share of loans in FX. Brown and De Haas (2012) examine bank-level survey data from 20 transition
countries and find that banks with a higher share of foreign currency customer deposits lend more in for-
eign currency to firms and households. Brown et al. (2014) confirm this result using administrative data
from one Bulgarian Bank. Brown et al. (2011) and Fidrmuc et al. (2013) use survey data to provide firm-
level and household-level evidence on the determinants of foreign currency borrowing in Emerging
Europe. Hake et al. (2014) provide a meta-analysis of studies on the determinants of dollarization in
Emerging Europe and Latin America.
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and financial dollarization within Russia. They match regional-level data on CPI infla-
tion with data on the currency denomination of bank deposits and loans for 71 Russian
regions over the period 2005–8. They find that regions with higher local inflation expe-
rience a stronger dollarization of bank deposits.
Valev (2012) provides household-level evidence on the use of foreign currency as a
means of payment in Eastern Europe. Using household survey data from Bulgaria in
2003 he finds that the use of the Euro (rather than Bulgarian Lev) as a means of pay-
ment is related to network effects rather than to expected currency depreciation. Using
the same Euro Survey data as we use in this paper, Stix (2013) provides evidence on
why households hold cash in foreign currency as opposed to domestic currency. In con-
trast to Valev (2012) these cash holdings are not necessarily confined to payments but
also serve as a store of value. His results highlight both the role of network effects (i.e.
households are more likely to hold cash in foreign currency if they report that payments
in foreign currency are common) and of depreciation expectations.
2.3. Our contribution
We complement the above empirical literature by employing household-level data
to study the determinants of foreign currency deposits in Central, Eastern and South-
eastern Europe. The use of household-level as opposed to aggregate data allows us to
address a number of identification problems that are inherent in the latter: (1) house-
hold-level data allow us to isolate the behavior of individual savers from that of firms;
(2) household-level data allow us to disentangle demand drivers of deposit dollarization
from supply-side drivers; (3) household-level measures of monetary expectations and net-
work effects enable us to accurately identify the main determinants of financial
dollarization.
The use of household-level data also allows us to study heterogeneities in the
preferences for foreign currency deposits across households: we can establish to what
extent households’ preferences for foreign currency deposits are related to household
age and personal experience of past financial crises. We can also establish to what extent
foreign currency deposit preferences are related to the financial sophistication of
households.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Empirical framework and hypotheses
The empirical framework for our analysis is presented in Figure 2. Based on the theories
reviewed above we conjecture that household demand for foreign currency deposits
(as opposed to local currency deposits) is directly affected by (1) monetary expectations
of the household (exchange rate and inflation expectations); (2) network effects (the
use of foreign currency as a means of storage or payment by other households); and
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(3) selected socioeconomic characteristics of the household (income, risk tolerance, finan-
cial literacy).
We further conjecture that deposit substitution may be indirectly affected by house-
hold-level experiences of financial crises in the past as well as by the household’s assess-
ment of current policies and institutions. Existing evidence suggests that monetary
expectations household preferences (e.g. risk tolerance) and financial behavior may
be influenced by past macroeconomic turbulence. Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012)
document hysteresis in monetary expectations of households.6 Osili and Paulson (2014)
show that households that have experienced a banking crisis in the past are less likely to
use bank deposit accounts. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) document that households
which have experienced macroeconomic downturns are less risk tolerant and have a
lower propensity to invest in financial markets. Employing the same survey data we use
in this study Stix (2013) documents that memories of past banking crises and current
trust in the banking sector affect the propensity of households to save in cash as opposed
to with banks.
Based on this empirical framework we split our analysis into two sections: first, we
examine to what extent deposit euroization is driven by individual monetary expecta-
tions, network effects and socioeconomic characteristics of the household. Second,
we examine how past experiences of financial crises as opposed to the assessment of eco-
nomic policies and institutions affect deposit substitution indirectly through monetary
expectations. With respect to these questions we test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Households prefer foreign currency as opposed to local currency deposits if (1)
they expect a depreciation of the local currency and or higher domestic inflation, and (2) if they
perceive that a larger share of other households in their country hold foreign currency deposits.
Monetary expectations 
(exchange rate, inflation)
Past financial crises(high inflation, currency-crises, 
banking crises)
Network effects
(commonness of savings and 
payments in foreign currency)
Socioeconomic characteristics
(wealth, remittances, financial 
literacy, risk aversion)
Current economic and political 
conditions 
(trust in policies and institutions)
Demand for foreign 
currency deposits
Figure 2. Empirical framework.
6 Feige (2003) provides evidence for hysteresis of currency substitution in transition economies.
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Hypothesis 2: Households which experienced a financial crisis in the past and households that
have a negative assessment of current policies and institutions are more likely to distrust the do-
mestic currency and thus are more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits.
Motivated by the recent literature on financial sophistication and financial decision
making we further examine to what extent household education and financial literacy
affect the demand for foreign currency deposits. Existing evidence suggests that finan-
cially literate households (or households with strong cognitive abilities) are more likely to
hold more sophisticated financial assets (Christelis et al., 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2011)
and are more likely to diversify their financial asset holdings (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009).7
Financial sophistication may also affect the sensitivity of household currency choice to
monetary expectations and network effects. First, the existing evidence shows that house-
holds with stronger numerical abilities are more likely to successfully process complex fi-
nancial information (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2013). In our setting, it is therefore likely
that households with higher education and stronger financial literacy predominantly
base their deposit currency choices on available and relevant financial information re-
garding future exchange rate developments. Second, Hong et al. (2004) show that social
interaction affects stock market participation and that this network effect is stronger for
the better educated and wealthy–i.e. financially sophisticated households. They argue
that social interaction may affect investment behavior as (1) households learn about
more complex financial assets and (2) households draw utility from being able to ‘talk
about’ holding such assets. In our setting this could imply that the deposit currency
choices of financial sophisticated households are more likely to be subject to network
effects.
Based on the above evidence we derive our third empirical hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Financially sophisticated households, e.g. better educated and financially literate
households, are more likely to hold foreign currency deposits. Moreover, the currency choice of
financially sophisticated households is more sensitive to exchange rate expectations and network
effects than that of households with less financial sophistication.
3.2. The Euro Survey data
Our household-level data are taken from the Euro Survey project of the Austrian
Central Bank (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, OeNB). Our analysis focuses on the two
surveys which were conducted in Fall 2011 and Fall 2012, and for which instruments
7 By contrast, recent evidence (based on the same survey data we use) also documents that households
which are literate with respect to the implication of exchange rate changes issues are less likely to choose
foreign currency as opposed to local currency loans (Beckmann and Stix, 2014).
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were devised to elicit detailed information about deposit substitution and monetary
expectations.
For each of the two survey waves, face-to-face interviews were carried out with
roughly 1,000 randomly chosen respondents aged over 14 in each country. For the esti-
mations in this paper, we only use data for respondents above the age of 18 who are ei-
ther employed, unemployed or retired. This restriction was chosen to make sure that the
sample only includes respondents who face economic choices concerning savings deci-
sions and leaves us with a sample of 16,375 observations. Due to missing information for
selected household-level covariates the number of observations in each of our
regressions deviates from this number. All variables that are used in our empirical
analysis are defined in Appendix A1, while Appendix A2 presents descriptive statistics.
These descriptive statistics as well as subsequent regressions are not weighted.
Box 2: The OeNB Euro Survey
As part of its strategic focus on the economic analysis of the countries of
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank
(OeNB) launched the Euro Survey project in 2007. The goal of this survey
is to collect information from individuals about the role of the Euro in house-
holds’ portfolios in ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European
countries: six EU Members States which are not part of the Euro-area
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) as well as
four (potential) EU candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
FYR Macedonia and Serbia). In these countries, repeated cross-sectional sur-
veys have been conducted since Fall 2007 with a core questionnaire and varying
special topics.
The surveys are centrally organized by the Austrian Gallup Institute
(Karmasin Marktforschung) and carried out by national contractors in the re-
spective countries. In general, samples are selected via a multistage stratified
random sample procedure, with the exception of Bulgaria, where a variant of
random quota sampling is applied. For countries that apply multistage stratified
random sampling, strata are formed according to regions (typically NUTS II re-
gions or equivalents) and urbanization levels and the sampling points represent
the whole territory of the countries surveyed (until Spring 2012, only the popu-
lation of the ten largest cities was sampled in Poland; thereafter the surveys
cover Poland as a whole) and starting points are selected randomly. Further
addresses are selected using standard ‘random route’ procedures from the start-
ing point. Finally, the selection of the interviewee in each household is random-
ized by standard procedures. The surveys may be conducted as part of omnibus
surveys or as stand-alone surveys.
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3.3. Deposit substitution
The Euro Survey provides us with two indicators of deposit substitution. The first indi-
cator measures the share of deposits held in foreign currency for those households which
have savings deposits at a bank. Survey respondents are asked whether they personally
(or jointly with a partner) have a current account (transaction account) and/or a savings
In each country the target population comprises residents aged 15 years or
older and interviews are carried out face-to-face at the respondent’s residence.
Respondents do not get incentives for participating. The share of refused inter-
views amounts to 34% on average per country. The final sample per country
contains 1,000 respondents.
We employ survey data from Fall 2011 and Fall 2012. In these surveys the first
section of the Euro Survey questionnaire elicits respondents’ evaluations and ex-
pectations of the current and future economic conditions. The second and third
parts of the survey include questions about saving and borrowing activities of
the household. The remaining sections of the questionnaire gather information
on (1) the role of foreign currencies for incoming and outgoing payments, (2)
personal experience of banking and currency crises, as well as socioeconomic in-
formation on respondents. In general, the survey collects basic information on
households’ financial portfolios (i.e. ownership of assets) but does not inquire
about amounts. Another difference in comparison to household wealth surveys
(e.g., European Central Bank, 2013) is that the unit of observation is the respon-
dent and not the household. However the survey accounts for joint ownership
of financial assets by asking whether the interviewed person owns them person-
ally or jointly with a partner.
Further details and selected results can be found at http://www.oenb.at/en/
Monetary-Policy/Surveys/OeNB-Euro-Survey.html (accessed March 25,
2014).
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deposit account (savings book, term deposit) with a bank. The overwhelming
majority of the survey respondents are banked with 72% reporting that they have an
account for transaction purposes. However, less than one in five respondents (17%) re-
ports that they hold savings in a deposit account. Respondents who report a savings ac-
count are asked whether a share of the savings is denominated in foreign currency, and
if yes, what share is denominated in foreign currency. The variable FC deposit share takes
on the value 0–3 if the household reports that 0, 1–40, 41–60, 61–100% of their savings
deposits are held in foreign currency. Table 1 shows that 907 of the 2,798 respondents
with a savings account (32%) report to hold at least part of these deposits in foreign cur-
rency. Among the households which do have foreign currency deposits, the median
share of deposits held in foreign currency is 80%. These figures suggest that only few
households diversify their deposits between local and foreign currency.8
Our second indicator of deposit substitution measures household preferences for for-
eign currency as opposed to local currency deposits. All survey respondents were asked
the following hypothetical question: ‘Suppose you had [an amount of about two average monthly
wages in local currency] to deposit in a savings account. Would you choose to deposit this amount
in. . .(a) [the respective local currency], (b) Euro, (c) US dollar, (d) other foreign currency? ’. The
dummy variable FC preference takes a value of one if the respondent prefers any foreign
currency and zero if the respondent prefers local currency.
Table 1 shows that 44% of all households in our sample respond that they would pre-
fer foreign currency to local currency deposits. It is noteworthy that the share of house-
holds which prefer foreign currency is almost identical among households which have a
savings account (43%) and households which do not have a savings account (45%).
Importantly, among the households with a savings account stated preferences for foreign
Table 1. Deposit substitution: preferences versus actual shares
Households
without a
deposit
account
Households with a deposit account All
households
All Only local
currency
deposits
With foreign
currency
deposits
(n¼ 13,577) (n¼ 2,798) (n¼ 1,891) (n¼ 907) (n¼ 16,375)
Mean share of FC deposits (%) 23 0 72
Median share of FC deposits (%) 0 0 80
FC preference (mean) 0.45 0.43 0.27 0.74 0.44
Note: Results of a t-test of equal sample means for FC deposit preference for households with only an LC deposit and
households with an FC deposit yields a test statistic of 26.91 (P-value< 0.01).
8 Households may of course diversify the currency composition of their total liquid financial wealth
(cashþ transaction accountsþ deposit account) across local and foreign currency. See Stix (2013) for evi-
dence on the use of cash vs. bank deposits as a means of storage.
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currency correspond well with the actual holding of foreign currency deposits. Among
households with foreign currency deposits, 74% respond to the hypothetical question by
preferring foreign currency deposits, compared to only 27% among households which
hold only local currency deposits.
Our survey-based indicators of deposit substitution provide a surprisingly accurate
picture of aggregate foreign currency deposit holdings in Central, Eastern and
Southeastern Europe. Figure 3 plots the mean of the survey-reported FC deposit share
(left panel) and FC preference (right panel) by country as reported in the survey against
the aggregate share of bank deposits held in foreign currency as reported by national
monetary authorities. The figure shows that both the share of foreign currency deposits
and the stated preferences for foreign currency deposits are highly correlated with
aggregate deposit substitution.
Our measure of foreign currency deposit preferences (FC preference) has three main
advantages over our measure of foreign currency deposit holdings (FC deposit share): first, it
allows us to examine preferences regarding foreign currency deposits for all households
rather than just the small share of those households with a savings account. Second, it pro-
vides us with an unbiased measure of household demand for foreign currency deposits, as
the use of foreign currency savings accounts may be affected by supply factors (i.e. differen-
tial minimum balances for accounts in foreign currency). Third, relying on survey-reported
savings behavior, rather than administrative data, may lead to imprecise results as house-
holds do not accurately report their savings behavior. For example, households may un-
derreport their savings if they are reluctant to disclose their wealth to strangers. Our
hypothetical question on foreign currency preferences is less affected by disclosure issues
than the question on actual savings.
Figure 3. Deposit euroization: survey versus aggregate data.
Notes: This ﬁgure compares evidence on the share of foreign currency deposits and foreign currency preferences
(among households with deposits) from the Euro Survey to evidence on aggregate deposit substitution from mone-
tary statistics. In the right panel, we use responses only for households which have a savings account so that the
reported mean is representative for those households which are covered by the aggregate monetary statistics. The
latter data are inherently based only on the sample of deposit account holders.
Sources: OeNB Euro Survey data from 2011 and 2012, the deposit substitution index is calculated from national
central bank data for the year 2011.
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A drawback of the indicator FC preference is that it asks households to choose between
either foreign currency deposits or local currency deposits. Thus, it does not precisely
measure currency preferences for those households who wish to diversify between local
and foreign currency deposits. However, Table 1 shows that few households in our
sample who maintain deposit accounts do diversify between currencies. This finding
suggests that despite its binary nature FC preference is unlikely to be plagued by consider-
able measurement error. Our main analysis is thus based on this indicator.
3.4. Monetary expectations
The Euro Survey provides us with a range of indicators for monetary expectations
at the respondent level. We employ two indicators of medium-term exchange rate
expectations. Each respondent is asked whether they think the respective local cur-
rency will depreciate, stay the same or appreciate against the Euro over the next
year. The dummy variable Depreciation (1-year) takes on the value 1 for households
which report that they expect a depreciation of the local currency and 0 for house-
holds which expect no change or an appreciation of the local currency over the
next 12 months.9 Expected exchange rate volatility is elicited with the survey ques-
tion ‘How predictable do you think is the exchange rate of the [LOCAL CURRENCY] vis-a`-vis
the Euro over the next 12 months? ’ The categorical variable Exchange rate unpredictable (1-
year) takes on values from 0 (very predictable) to 3 (very unpredictable). This indica-
tor does not exactly reflect the theoretical concept of the real exchange rate volatility
proposed by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) as it measures nominal instead of real ex-
change rate volatility.10 On the other hand, this survey-based measure is superior to
the use of volatilities derived from ex-post exchange rates because it is forward look-
ing and it captures expected volatility even in countries with a currency board and
in countries which have had a rather stable exchange rate.
Our two measures of medium-term inflation expectations were elicited similar to
those for exchange rates: the dummy variable Inflation higher (1-year) is a dummy variable
which takes on the value 1 for respondents which expect inflation to increase over the
next 12 months and takes on the value 0 for households which expect lower or similar
inflation. The dummy variable Inflation unpredictable (1-year) takes on values from 0 for
respondents who state that inflation is very predictable over the next 12 months to 3 for
respondents who state that inflation is very unpredictable.
9 Similar information is available for expectations over the next five years. As all results are qualitatively
similar to the one year-expectations we do not report estimates based on five-year expectations.
10 This also reflects a balance between theoretical precision and what layman can understand, e.g. it
would be very difficult to obtain a direct survey measure of real exchange rate volatility in a public
opinion survey.
110 MARTIN BROWN AND HELMUT STIX
In addition to our indicators of medium-term monetary expectations, we employ two
indicators of long-term monetary expectations. These indicators are based on questions
which elicit sentiments towards the local currency and the Euro respectively. The survey
elicits the consent of respondents (on a 6-step Likert scale) to the following statement:
‘Over the next five years, the [CURRENCY] will be very stable and trustworthy.’ The categorical
variable Local currency unstable (5-year) takes on values from 0 for households which dis-
agree or strongly disagree to 2 for households which agree or strongly agree with this
statement with respect to the local currency. The categorical variable Euro unstable (5-
year) is defined similarly with respect to the Euro instead of the local currency.
Figure 4 presents the sample means by country for three indicators of monetary
expectations: Depreciation (1-year), Inflation higher (1-year) and Local currency unstable (5-year).
Unsurprisingly, the figure shows that more households expect depreciation in countries
with a floating exchange rate regime (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Romania and Serbia)
than in countries with a currency board or a quasi-peg (e.g. Bulgaria and Croatia).
However, in line with previous evidence (Carlson and Valev, 2008) the figure reveals
that expectations of depreciations are prevalent even in countries that have maintained
a very stable exchange rate or even a currency board. Figure 4 also shows that–across
countries–our sentiment indicator of long-term monetary expectations [Local currency un-
stable (5-year)] is highly correlated with medium-term exchange rate expectations
[Depreciation (1-year)]. With respect to inflation expectations the figure does not reveal
any discernible differences in inflation expectations across exchange rate regimes.
Figure 4. Monetary expectations.
Notes: The ﬁgure displays mean exchange rate and inﬂation expectations by country. Countries are grouped
according to exchange rate regimes (ﬂoating versus (Quasi-)Peg).
Sources: OeNB Euro Survey data from 2011 and 2012.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the individual-level inflation expectations also do not indicate a
marked difference for the countries that pursue an inflation targeting regime (Albania
and Serbia).
3.5. Network effects
The market failure theory of asset substitution and the currency substitution theory
suggest that deposit substitution may be driven by network effects. We include an indica-
tor for both types of network effects. Network effects with respect to asset holdings are
derived from the consent to the statement that ‘In [MY COUNTRY] it is very common to
hold foreign currency deposits’. The dummy variable Network savings strong takes on the value 1
for respondents which strongly agree or agree to this statement (32% of our sample) and
0 otherwise. Network effects with respect to payments are derived from the consent to
the statement that ‘In [MY COUNTRY] it is very common to make certain payments in Euro’.
The dummy variable Network payments strong takes on the value 1 for respondents which
strongly agree or agree to this statement (26% of our sample) and 0 otherwise.
Our two indicators for network effects capture a respondent’s assessment of whether
other households in the same country use the Euro for savings and payments. These
indicators are imperfect proxies for network effects as suggested by theory. First and
foremost, the reference group in each question is not the peer group of the respondent
or the group of potential trading partners. Thus the questions may capture the general
use and availability of foreign currency savings products and the euroization of transac-
tions, rather than the use of foreign currency among the more narrow reference group
of the respondent. Second, the responses to both of the above questions may be influ-
enced by self-serving biases: households which use the Euro for savings and payments
themselves may infer that other households in their country do the same.
Figure 5 shows that despite its potential shortcomings our main network variable
seems to capture the local use of the Euro for savings in the region where the household
is located. We plot, by region, the mean value of Network savings strong against the mean
share of households with a foreign currency deposit account (among households with a
deposit account). The figure shows a high correlation (0.65, P< 0.01) between the two
indicators at a regional level, suggesting that our network variable does not just capture
the use of the Euro at a country level. This correlation also holds if we restrict our net-
work indicator to households which themselves do not have a deposit account, suggesting
that our indicator of network effects is not primarily driven by a self-serving bias.
3.6. Financial sophistication and socioeconomic controls
We use two indicators to measure financial sophistication at the household level. Our
first indicator relates to the education level of the respondent. The dummy variable
Education high takes on the value one for households with a higher than primary or lower
secondary education. Our second indicator of financial sophistication captures the
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knowledge of three basic financial concepts: (1) compound interest; (2) inflation and
real interest; (3) depreciation.11 The variable Financial Literacy takes on the value of 0–3
depending on the number of correct answers to the following three questions:
‘Suppose you had [100 LOCAL CURRENCY] in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year.
Disregarding any bank fees, how much do you think you would have in the account after 5 years if you left the money
to grow? (More than 102 LC/Exactly 102 LC/Less than 102 LC/Do not know/No answer)’.
‘Suppose that the interest rate on your savings account was 4% per year and inflation was 5% per year. Again,
disregarding any bank fees–after 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same, or less than today
with the money in this account? (More/Exactly the same/Less/Do not know/No answer)’.
‘Suppose that you have taken a loan in EURO. Then the exchange rate of the [LOCAL CURRENCY] depreci-
ates against the EURO. How does this change the amount of local currency you need to make your loan
installments . . . (Increase / Stays the same / Decreases / Don’t know / No answer)’.
The Euro Survey further allows us to control for socioeconomic characteristics of
respondents which are likely to affect the demand for foreign currency deposits.
Throughout our analysis we control for indicators of Income level, income source
(Self-employed, Remittances) and real asset holdings (Homeowner, Car). In order to control for
Figure 5. Network effects and deposit euroization by region.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows regional shares of deposits in foreign currency (in %) and the regional share of respondents
with ‘Network savings strong’ (in %). The squares denote regions in countries with a low degree of euroization (Czech
Republic, Poland Hungary). The diamonds denote regions in countries with a high degree of euroization
(Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia).
Sources: OeNB Euro Survey data from 2011 and 2012.
11 The questions on compound interest and inflation correspond to those uses in several recent studies for
OECD countries (see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011 for an overview) and transition economies (Klapper
and Panos, 2011; Beckmann, 2013). The question on exchange rate literacy is new. We thank Sascha
Becker for pointing out that the use of the word ‘depreciation’ might imply that this literacy measure
also reflects semantic literacy.
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potential transaction costs we account for the self-assessed proximity of the respondent
to the nearest bank branch (Distance to bank). To account for intra-household hedging
of liabilities in local and foreign currency we control for whether the respondent has a
local currency or foreign currency loan (LC loan, FC loan). Finally, we control for the Age
of the household as well as a self-reported measure of risk tolerance (Risk averse).
Definitions and summary statistics of all household-level control variables are presented
in Appendices A1 and A2.
3.7. Crisis experience, current policies and institutions
Several of the countries covered by our sample experienced currency crises during
the 1990s. For example, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia all
had CPI inflation rates of close to 100% (or higher) for at least 1 year between 1994 and
2001. Figure 6 shows that the instability of domestic monetary policy was associated
with sharp depreciations of the respective currencies during the 1990s. The deprecia-
tions experienced by many countries in the recent financial crisis (2008–12) seem
by comparison rather mild. The monetary instability in Eastern Europe during the
1990s was accompanied by a wave of banking crises. Laeven and Valencia (2012) report
a banking crisis for nine countries in our sample during that decade: Albania (1994),
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–6), Bulgaria (1996–7), Croatia (1998–9), the Czech
Republic (1996–2000), Hungary (1991–5), FYR Macedonia (1993–5), Poland (1992–4)
and Romania (1990–2).12
The Euro Survey provides several indicators of how households experienced the
financial crises of the 1990s: All respondents are asked the following question: ‘If you think
back in time to periods of economic turbulences prior to 2008, e.g. very high inflation, banking crisis or re-
stricted access to savings deposits. At that time did you personally incur a financial loss due to such
events? . . . . And what about your close relatives. Did they incur a financial loss due to such events?’
The dummy variables Crisis experience is one for households which answer positively to
the first question. The dummy variable Crisis experience (relatives) is one for those who re-
port crisis experience of relatives but no personal crisis experience.13 The survey further
asks households whether they remember periods of high inflation and sharp devalua-
tions of the local currency. The variable Memory of Inflation is a dummy variable which is
1 for all households which remember such episodes.
We use two indicators to capture the households’ assessments of current government
policies and institutions. The variable Trust in government is 1 for households which report
that they completely or somewhat trust the government and 0 for households which do
not trust the government. The variable Economy better (5-year) is 1 for households which
agree to the statement that ‘over the next 5 years the economic situation of my country
12 The database of Laeven and Valencia (2012) does not include Serbia.
13 Almost all households who report own experience also report experience of close relatives.
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will improve’.14 We use this variable as an indicator of households’ trust in (current
and future) domestic economic policies.
De Nicolo et al. (2005) document that aggregate deposit dollarization across countries
is correlated with the general quality of the institutional framework (rule of law, corrup-
tion). The Euro Survey provides two indicators which allow us to capture the respon-
dent’s assessment of broad institutional quality. The variable Trust in police takes on the
value 1 of the respondent reports that he completely or somewhat trusts the police and 0
otherwise. The variable Cash used to avoid taxes takes on the value of 1 if the household re-
sponds that people in their country often use cash to evade taxes.
Figure 6. Inﬂation and depreciation, 1994–2012.
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the development of CPI inﬂation and exchange rates per country over the period
1994–2012. The top panel displays annual CPI inﬂation per country (capped at 100%). The bottom panel shows
annual depreciation of the local currency vis-a`-vis the US dollar (capped at 100%).
Sources: World Development Indicators.
14 To make sure that we are measuring the respondent’s outlook on the general economy and not just
their personal situation the variable Financial situation bad controls for the household’s (self-assessed) per-
sonal economic situation.
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Our data suggests that our respondent-level indicators of past crises do reflect cross-
country differences in past monetary performance: the share of respondents which
report memories of inflation in our dataset is highest (above 70%) in Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Serbia and Romania–all countries which experienced inflation rates close
to (or exceeding) 100% during the 1990s (see Figure 6).
Our subjective measures of institutional quality are partly correlated with indicators
of political risk as published in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). For
example, the mean value of Trust in police for eight of our sample countries15 is positively
correlated with the ICRG indices for government stability and bureaucratic quality.
However, Trust in police is not at all correlated with the ICRG subindex for corruption
or democratic accountability.16
4. MONETARY EXPECTATIONS, NETWORK EFFECTS AND DEPOSIT
SUBSTITUTION
4.1. Monetary expectations and network effects
Table 2 reports our full-sample estimates of the relationship between deposit substitu-
tion, monetary expectations and network effects. In columns (1–3) of the table we report
linear probability estimates for our preferred indicator of deposit substitution FC prefer-
ence. In columns (4–6) we present robustness tests, employing our alternative indicator
of deposit substitution FC deposit share. Panel A reports estimates for our indicators of
monetary expectations and network effects. Panel B reports estimates for our socioeco-
nomic control variables from the same regression models. In all models we include fixed
effects for each region * survey-wave so that our estimates capture how differences in
individual monetary expectations affect household-level deposit substitution within a
given economic environment.17
Panel A of Table 2 documents that deposit substitution at the household level is
strongly related to monetary expectations and network effects. The column (1) estimate
for Depreciation (1-year) points to an economically relevant impact of individual exchange
rate expectations: households which expect a depreciation of the local currency within
the next year are 10.5 percentage points more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits
than households which expect a stable exchange rate or an appreciation of the local
currency. By comparison the mean share of households which prefer foreign currency
deposits in this sample is 48%. The column (1) estimates for Exchange rate unpredictable
15 We omit Bosnia and Herzegovina and FRY Macedonia due to missing data from ICRG.
16 In line with this finding, Trust in police is also not correlated with the 2011 corruption perception index
published by Transparency International.
17 The survey covers 75 regions in our ten countries so that we can account for local economic conditions
and the structure of the banking sector. Brown et al. (2013b) show that the use of financial services
varies strongly across regions within countries of South-East Europe.
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Table 2. Monetary expectations, network effects and deposit substitution
Dependent variable FC preference [0,1] FC deposit share [0,1,2,3]
Household sample All With a deposit account
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Coefﬁcients for monetary expectations and network effects
Depreciation (1-year) 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.129** 0.157** 0.143**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067)
Exchange rate
unpredictable (1-year)
0.007 0.023
(0.008) (0.027)
Network savings strong 0.134*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.493*** 0.505*** 0.519***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.114) (0.112) (0.111)
Network payments strong 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.020 0.056 0.039
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.084) (0.085) (0.092)
Inﬂation higher (1-year) 0.001 0.033
(0.014) (0.064)
Inﬂation unpredictable
(1-year)
0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.027)
Local currency unstable
(5-year)
0.054*** 0.058*
(0.010) (0.034)
EURO unstable (5-year) 0.053*** 0.007
(0.009) (0.046)
Panel B. Coefﬁcients for socioeconomic control variables
Remittances 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.452*** 0.449*** 0.451***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.111) (0.109) (0.111)
Self-employed 0.033 0.031 0.039* 0.069 0.057 0.064
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.070) (0.071) (0.077)
Income high 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.202** 0.197** 0.238**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.089) (0.091) (0.096)
Income middle 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.118 0.111 0.118
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.094) (0.097) (0.103)
Income na 0.048** 0.047** 0.044** 0.183* 0.175* 0.219**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.094) (0.097) (0.108)
Car 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.149** 0.179** 0.153**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.074) (0.072) (0.077)
Homeowner 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.031 0.041 0.026
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074)
LC loan 0.016 0.011 0.001 0.206** 0.195** 0.198**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.087) (0.088) (0.090)
FC loan 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.058 0.037 0.060
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.085) (0.087) (0.080)
Distance to bank 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.020 0.024
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Education 0.023* 0.022* 0.027* 0.119 0.111 0.126*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.072) (0.069) (0.071)
Financial literacy 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.023 0.017 0.035
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Age 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 0.009 0.008 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
(Continued)
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(1-year) suggest that–controlling for an expected depreciation–the predictability of the
exchange rate does not affect deposit substitution.
The column (2) estimates in Table 2 suggest that inflation expectations hardly affect
deposit substitution. The coefficients for Inflation higher (1-year) and Inflation unpredictable
(1-year) are economically small and statistically insignificant. This result may seem sur-
prising given the recent evidence which shows that inflation targeting reduces financial
dollarization in emerging markets (Lin and Ye, 2013) and that regional variation in con-
sumer price inflation affects deposit dollarization in Russia (Brown et al., 2013a). What
our evidence suggests is that low inflation and inflation targeting may affect financial
dollarization through their effect on expected exchange rates as opposed to their effect
on domestic inflation per se.
The column (3) estimates for Local currency unstable (5-year) and Euro unstable (5-year)
show that long-term trust in the stability of the local currency and the Euro strongly af-
fect deposit substitution. Households which view their local currency as not at all trust-
worthy over the next five years (Local currency unstable¼ 2) are 10.8 percentage points
more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits than those which view their local cur-
rency as very trustworthy (Local currency unstable¼ 0). Similarly, households which view
the Euro as not trustworthy over the next 5 years (Euro unstable¼ 2) are 10.4 percentage
points less likely to prefer foreign currency deposits than households which view the
Euro as very trustworthy (Euro unstable¼ 0).
Table 2. (Continued)
Dependent variable FC preference [0,1] FC deposit share [0,1,2,3]
Household sample All With a deposit account
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age sq. (1e-3) 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.068 0.063 0.047
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.123) (0.116) (0.114)
Risk averse 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.058 0.016 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.092) (0.086) (0.088)
Mean of dependent
variable
0.48 0.48 0.48 0.90 0.90 0.90
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Region * Wave ﬁxed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.42 0.42 0.42
No. of households 10,654 10,803 10,078 2,031 2,064 1,957
No. of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10
No. of regions 75 75 75 72 72 72
No. of survey waves 2 2 2 2 2 2
Notes: The dependent variables in this table are FC preference (columns 1–3) and FC deposit share (columns 4–6). All
models report estimates from linear probability models including ﬁxed effects per region * wave. Panel A reports
estimates for our indicators of monetary expectations and network effects. Panel B reports estimates for our
socioeconomic control variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at
the region-wave level. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level, respectively. All variables are
deﬁned in Appendix A1.
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In columns (1–3) of Table 2 (Panel A) the estimated coefficients for Network savings
strong are positive, statistically significant and sizeable in terms of economic magnitude:
households which agree that it is common to hold foreign currency savings in their coun-
try are 13 percentage points more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits than house-
holds which do not agree to the respective statement. We take this as evidence that in
addition to the role of monetary expectations there are strong network effects driving
household demand for foreign currency as a medium of storage.18
The insignificant estimates for Network payments strong suggest that transaction costs in
payments do not affect the demand for foreign currency deposits. This result is not that
surprising seeing that FC preference captures households’ preferences for storing a sizeable
volume of wealth (2 months average wage) which arguably exceeds households’ require-
ments for regular payments. Valev (2012), by contrast, reports evidence suggesting that
network effects in payments do affect the preferences of households for holding cash in
foreign currency.
In columns (4–6) of Table 2 we examine whether the relation between monetary ex-
pectations, network effects and deposit substitution is confirmed in estimates of actual
foreign currency deposit holdings for those households which have a deposit account
(FC deposit share). The results displayed in Panel A of the table suggest that this is the
case. The estimated coefficients for Depreciation (1-year) and Local currency unstable (5-year)
are statistically significant and economically large, confirming that medium-term and
long-term expectations regarding local currency stability affect deposit substitution. The
positive and significant coefficient for Network savings strong confirms that deposit substitu-
tion by individual households is associated with the perceived use of foreign currency
savings in the country.
4.2. Financial sophistication and socioeconomic controls
Panel B of Table 2 reports the estimates for our socioeconomic control variables. The
results suggest that the demand for foreign currency deposits is strongly related to house-
hold income sources and income levels. Incoming payments in foreign currency are
strongly correlated with deposit substitution. The regular receipt of cross-border
Remittances increases preferences for foreign currency deposits by 11 percentage points
(columns 1–3). This significant effect of remittances is confirmed in our estimates of
shares of foreign currency deposits among those households with a deposit account (col-
umns 4–6). Self-employed households and households with higher income (including
those who do not report their income) are also more likely to prefer/hold foreign
18 In unreported robustness tests we show that the estimated coefficient for Network savings strong is robust
when estimated in the sample of households which do not have a savings account. This finding suggests
that the positive correlation between Network savings strong and FC deposit preference is not driven by a self-
serving bias.
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currency deposits. We also find some evidence that households with higher wealth (as
proxied by Car ownership) are more likely to hold foreign currency deposits.
Panel B estimates also document a nonlinear relationship between household age and
preferences for foreign currency deposits: the estimate for Age is significant and positive,
while the estimate for Age squared is significant and negative. The magnitude of the two
coefficients suggest that the marginal effect of age on preferences for foreign currency
deposits is positive for respondents of age 18–66 and negative for older respondents.
We find no evidence for an association between self-reported risk preferences (Risk averse)
and preferences for foreign currency deposits.
In Panel B of Table 2 we find mixed evidence for an association between deposit sub-
stitution and financial sophistication of the household. Households with high levels of ed-
ucation are 3 percentage points more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits than
households with low education levels (columns 1–3). However, we find no correlation
between Financial Literacy of the household and preferences for foreign currency deposits.
The latter result is surprising given that several recent studies have documented a posi-
tive correlation between financial literacy and the use of more sophisticated financial
products (Van Rooij et al., 2011) and financial diversification (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009).
Table 3 therefore explores the relation between financial sophistication and deposit sub-
stitution in more detail.
As a benchmark for our investigation into the role of financial sophistication, column
(1) of Table 3 replicates the column (1) estimates of Table 2. In column (2) of Table 3
we then drop household-level indicators of monetary expectations. The reason for doing
this is that the column (1) estimates omit a large number of respondents (1,613) who did
not answer the questions on monetary expectations. Our data show that these house-
holds are significantly less financial sophisticated (as measured by Financial literacy), so
that the column (1) results may be subject to selection bias.19 However, when we include
these households in our sample, we still fail to find a significant correlation between fi-
nancial literacy and foreign currency preferences.
In column (3–4) of Table 3 we examine to what extent financial sophistication of
households affects the role of monetary expectations and network effects in shaping the
demand for foreign currency deposits. We interact our indicators of monetary expecta-
tions and network effects with the variable Financial Literacy (column 3) and Education
(column 4). We conjecture that the assessment of future monetary conditions will have a
stronger impact on deposit substitution among financially sophisticated households than
among less sophisticated households. The column (3–4) estimates show that this is the
case: the estimated coefficient Financial Literacy * Depreciation (1-year) is positive and
19 Respondents who did not answer the questions on exchange rate expectations gave, on average, 1.27
correct answers to the three literacy questions. The respective number is 1.77 for respondents who did
answer the questions on exchange rate expectations. This difference is statistically significant with a
P-value of less than 0.01.
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significant in column (3). The magnitude of the interaction term suggests that the impact
of an expected depreciation of foreign currency preferences is three times higher among
households with a financial literacy score of three than among households with a finan-
cial literacy score of zero (14.6 versus 4.1 percentage points). In line with this finding the
Table 3. Financial sophistication and deposit substitution
Dependent variable FC preference
Sample All All All All
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Depreciation (1-year) 0.105*** 0.046* 0.066***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
Exchange rate unpredictable (1-year) 0.007 0.030** 0.002
(0.008) (0.014) (0.016)
Network savings strong 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.026)
Network payments strong 0.003 0.004 0.03 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024)
Education 0.023* 0.024** 0.023* 0.022
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.031)
Financial literacy 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
Financial literacy*
Depreciation (1-year) 0.033***
(0.012)
Exrate unpredictable (1-year) 0.013*
(0.007)
Network savings strong 0.013
(0.013)
Network payments strong 0.015
(0.013)
Education *
Depreciation (1-year) 0.051**
(0.025)
Exchange rate unpredictable (1-year) 0.013
(0.016)
Network savings strong 0.031
(0.025)
Network payments strong 0.018
(0.024)
Mean of dependent variable 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Region*Wave ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
# Households 10,654 12,239 10,654 10,654
# countries 10 10 10 10
# regions 75 75 75 75
# survey waves 2 2 2 2
Notes: The dependent variable in this table is FC preference. All models report estimates from linear probability mod-
els including ﬁxed effects per region*wave. All models include the following household control variables: Income,
Self-employed, Age, Homeowner, Car, Risk averse, Remittances, LC loan, FC loan, Distance to bank. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the region*wave level. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level, respectively. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A1.
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column (4) results show a positive and significant estimate of the interaction term
Education high * Depreciation (1-year). The column (3) results also show that exchange rate
volatility [Exchange rate unpredictable (1-year)] impacts stronger on deposit substitution
among financially literate households.
The evidence by Hong et al. (2004) on social interaction and household investment
behavior suggests that the role of network effects in deposit substitution may also be
stronger among the more financially sophisticated households. However, our column
(3-4) estimates in Table 3 do not show a stronger impact of network effects among more
financially sophisticated households. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term
Network savings strong * Financial Literacy (column 3) and Network savings strong * Education
(column 4) are both economically weak and statistically insignificant.
4.3. The role of the exchange rate regime and aggregate euroization
In this section we examine whether the impact of monetary expectations and network
effects on deposit substitution documented in our full sample (see Table 2) varies accord-
ing to the exchange rate regime of a country and the degree of aggregate euroization
within the country. It is likely that the impact of exchange rate expectations on deposit
substitution differs between countries with flexible exchange rates as opposed to coun-
tries with a pegged currency: in countries with a pegged currency the likelihood of
depreciation is lower than in countries with a flexible exchange rate (see Figure 4).
However, the magnitude of a depreciation is potentially larger for pegged currencies if a
depreciation does take place. We therefore conjecture that the impact of an expected
depreciation on deposit substitution should be stronger in countries with a pegged
exchange rate than in countries with a flexible exchange rate.
Our sample covers six countries with flexible exchange rates (Albania, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia), while four countries maintain a cur-
rency board or a (quasi-)peg (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR
Macedonia). In Table 4, columns (1–2) we replicate our model from Table 2 (column 1)
separately for these two sets of countries. The results show that monetary expectations
affect deposit substitution both in countries with flexible exchange rates (column 1) and
countries with pegged exchange rates (column 2). However, an expected depreciation of
the local currency has a much stronger impact on deposit substitution in countries with
pegged currencies. Comparing the point-estimates of Depreciation (1-year) in column (1) to
that in column (2) we see that an expected depreciation increases preferences for foreign
currency deposits more than twice as much in countries with a peg (16 percentage
points) than in countries with a flexible exchange rate (6 percentage points).20 Thus
while less households expect a depreciation in countries with a peg (see Figure 4), those
20 A Chow test rejects the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient of Depreciation (1-year) is equal in column
1 versus column 2.
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which do expect a depreciation are much more likely to substitute local for foreign cur-
rency deposits. It is often argued that policy makers in highly euroized economies which
have a (quasi)-peg in place are constrained in the choice of the exchange rate regime.
Any deviation from a peg would result in a strong shift towards foreign currency assets.
Our results provide support for this view.
In columns (3-4) of Table 4 we conduct separate estimates for countries with a low level
of euroization (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and countries with a high level of
euroization (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia,
Romania and Serbia). We are particularly interested in whether the strong network ef-
fects identified in our full sample estimates (see Table 2) are independent of the aggregate
level of euroization in a country. We find that the estimates for Network savings strong are at
least as strong in low-euroization countries as they are in high-euroization countries. This
finding confirms our interpretation that the variable Network savings strong captures habit ef-
fects based on individual experience and is not just a proxy for country-wide financial dol-
larization. In columns (5–6) we find similar results when we conduct separate estimates
for countries which are members of the European Union during our observation period
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania) and non-EU member states
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia).
4.4. Robustness checks
Several robustness tests of our main results from Table 2 are reported in the web appen-
dix to this paper. In Appendix W1 we verify that the linear probability model is appro-
priate for the estimation of our binary dependent variable FC preference by replicating the
analysis with a non-linear (probit) model (columns 1–4). We also verify that the linear
model is appropriate for our ordinal dependent variable FC deposit share by replicating
the analysis using an ordered probit model (columns 5–8). We find that the estimates
from the probit and ordered probit models confirm those from the linear probability
model employed in Table 2.
In Appendix W2 we present further robustness checks for our main results displayed
in column (1) of Table 2. In column (1) we verify that our main results are robust to
excluding regional fixed effects. In column (2) we check whether results are affected
by households who live in proximity to the Euro-area by including a measure of the
physical distance between the respondent and the Euro-area. Specifically, we use
the geo-coordinates of each primary sampling unit in the survey to establish whether the
respondent is located within 50 km of the geographical border of the Euro-area or not.
Our main results remain unchanged in columns (1–2), while the geographical distance
of the household to the Euro-area is insignificant in column (2).21 In columns (3–4) we
21 In case we omit regional fixed effects from column (2) the distance to the Euro-area dummy enters sig-
nificant with a negative sign, implying that households that live closer to this border are less likely to
prefer FC deposits.
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replicate model (1) from Table 2 for the 2012 and 2011 survey waves separately. The
results displayed show that our estimates of Depreciation (1-year) and Network savings strong
are similar for both survey waves. In column (5) we use additional information avail-
able in the 2011 survey wave to examine whether individual expectations about
future adoption of the Euro affect preferences for foreign currency deposits. Specifically
the 2011 wave asked respondents ‘When, in which year, do you think the Euro will be
introduced in [YOUR COUNTRY]?’. The column (5) results show that households
which expect the Euro to be adopted sometime in the future (as opposed to never) are
more likely to prefer foreign currency deposits. However, controlling for expected
Euro adoption does not affect our estimates for exchange rate expectations or network
effects.
In Appendix W3 we verify that our main findings are robust across countries.
We replicate model (1) from Table 2 for each country separately. The estimated coeffi-
cient for Depreciation (1-year) is statistically significant and economically large for seven
out of ten sample countries (Albania, Poland and Hungary are the notable exceptions).
The estimate for Network savings strong is statistically significant and economically large for
nine out of ten countries.
In Appendix W4 we check that the network effect estimated in Table 2 is not driven
by a self-serving bias. Column (1) repeats our full-sample estimates as displayed in col-
umn (1) of Table 2. Column (2) replicates that model but for the subsample of house-
holds which do not have a foreign currency savings account. The results show that the
estimated coefficient for Network savings strong is only slightly smaller in this subsample,
suggesting that it is not driven by a self-serving bias. In columns (3) we replace the re-
spondent-level indicators of network effects by the average of these indicators across all
other respondents in the same primary sampling unit, i.e. the respondent’s ‘neighbors’.
The results show that network effects as captured by the neighbors’ perceptions of the
use of the Euro for savings (Neighbours network savings strong) yield similar estimates to the
respondents own perceptions. Again this finding suggests that self-serving biases are not
driving the estimated network effect. In columns (4–5) of Appendix W4 we examine to
what extent our network indicator may be capturing the perceived availability of savings
products as opposed to the perceived use of such services by a respondent’s peers. In col-
umn (4) we report a subsample analysis for respondents who are most likely to be aware
of the availability of savings products; i.e. those who have a deposit account and live in a
town with a bank branch. In column (5) we report a subsample analysis for respondents
which are least likely to be aware of the availability of savings products; i.e. those who
do not have a deposit account and live in a town without a bank branch. Our large, pos-
itive and significant estimate for Network savings strong is confirmed in both subsamples,
suggesting that the indicator is not mainly capturing perceptions about the availability of
savings products.
Finally, in Appendix W5 we have verified that results of Table 2 are unaffected if
we employ separate dummy variables instead of categorical variables for Exchange rate
unpredictable (1-year), Local currency unstable (5-year) and EURO unstable (5-year).
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5. THE ROLE OF PAST CRISES, POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS
Our results so far document that household-specific exchange rate expectations as well
as network effects strongly affect the demand for foreign currency deposits. In this sec-
tion we turn to the second part of our empirical framework and examine how monetary
expectations and the demand for foreign currency deposits are related to individual ex-
perience of past financial crises as well as to respondents’ assessments of current policies
and institutions.
In Table 5 column (1) we relate a measure of exchange rate expectations Depreciation
(1-year) to indicators of crises experience (Crisis experience, Crisis experience relatives, Memory of
inflation) as well as the assessment of current government policies and institutions (Trust in
Government, Economy better, Cash used to avoid taxes).
Our estimates support the conjecture that hysteresis effects are present, i.e. that the
experience of past financial crises has a persistent effect on exchange rate expectations of
households. Respondents who had personally incurred losses during crises in the 1990s
are 5 percentage points more likely to expect a depreciation of the local currency over
the next twelve months, while households which remember periods of high inflation are
5.5 percentage points more likely to expect depreciation. Both of these effects are size-
able, given that 42% of the underlying sample expect a depreciation over the next year.
The finding that only personal losses and not losses of close relatives affect current mon-
etary expectations suggest that our measures of crisis experience are not just picking up
a general negative attitude towards past and current economic conditions.
The column (1) estimates also show that household-level trust in current policies and
institutions strongly affect monetary expectations. Households which trust their govern-
ment are 4.6 percentage points less likely to expect depreciation over the next
12 months. Households which expect the economic situation in their country to improve
over the next 5 years are 10 percentage points less likely to expect depreciation.
The column (1) results of Table 5 confirm that the monetary expectations of house-
holds are correlated with past financial crises, current policies and institutions. This find-
ing raises the question of whether our initial estimates of the impact of monetary
expectations (and network effects) on deposit substitution (see Table 2) are subject to an
omitted variable bias: the estimated impact of expected depreciation on foreign currency
deposit preferences may actually be driven by the (in Table 2 omitted) effect of past
financial crises. In column (2) of Table 5 we account for possible omitted variable bias
by estimating an enhanced model: we add our indicators of past crises, current policies
and institutions to our initial specification in column (1) of Table 2.
The regression results for the enhanced model in column (2) of Table 5 suggest that
our initial estimates of the role of monetary expectations and network effects are hardly
subject to omitted variable bias: the estimated coefficients for Depreciation (1-year) and
Network savings strong are of a similar economic magnitude and statistical precision as those
reported in Table 2. The results however also reveal a significant and economically rele-
vant effect of Crisis experience and Trust in government on foreign currency deposits, even af-
ter controlling for our indicators of monetary expectations and network effects. This
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finding stands in contrast to our empirical framework presented in Figure 2, which does
not account for a direct effect of past crises or institutions on deposit substitution. One
explanation for this finding is that our measures of monetary expectations, network ef-
fects and relevant household characteristics (risk aversion, financial literacy) are impre-
cisely measured and correlated with these ‘background’ variables.
Table 5. The role of past crises, current policies and institutions
Dependent variable Depreciation
(1 year)
FC
preference
FC preference FC preference
Sample All All Age:
below
median
Age:
above
median
At last
crisis:
young
(24 years)
At last
crisis: old
(>24 years)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depreciation (1-year) 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.087***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017)
Exchange rate unpredictable
(1-year)
0.012 0.020* 0.003 0.001 0.018
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
Network savings strong 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.122***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.029) (0.017)
Network payments strong 0.008 0.023 0.008 0.018 0.022
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022)
Crisis experience 0.050*** 0.047** 0.047* 0.040 0.020 0.059**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026)
Crisis experience relatives 0.007 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.010 0.040
(0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026)
Memory of inﬂation 0.055*** 0.019 0.012 0.022 0.011 0.020
(0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020)
Cash used to avoid taxes 0.003 0.011 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.015
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
Trust in government 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.059** 0.049** 0.060** 0.052**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022)
Trust in police 0.016 0.026 0.026 0.017 0.015 0.027
(0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.021)
Economy better (5 years) 0.103*** 0.027* 0.021 0.032 0.035 0.025
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020)
Mean of dependent variable 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.46 0.45
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Region*Wave ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22
No. of households 7,381 6,428 3,335 3,093 2,317 4,111
No. of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10
No. of regions 75 74 72 74 73 73
No. of survey waves 2 2 2 2 2 2
Notes: The dependent variables in this table are Depreciation (1 year) (column 1), and FC preference (columns 2–6).
Columns (1–2) are estimated on the full sample of households without missing data. Columns (3–4) report esti-
mates for households with below versus above (country-speciﬁc) median age. In columns (5–6) we report estimates
for households with an age of 24 years or below versus more than 24 years at the time of the last crisis (annual in-
ﬂation rate larger than 20%).All models report estimates from linear probability models including ﬁxed effects per
region-wave. All models include the following household control variables: Income, Self-employed, Education, Age,
Homeowner, Car, Financial literacy, Risk averse, Remittances, LC loan, FC loan, Distance to bank, Trust in Police, Financial situa-
tion bad. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the region-wave level. ***,
**, * denote signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level, respectively. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A1.
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We conclude our analysis with an examination of how the determinants of deposit
substitution vary across household cohorts. Is the impact of past financial crises and net-
work effects on deposit substitution stronger among older cohorts, while current policies
and monetary expectations have a stronger effect among younger cohorts? If so what
does this imply for policy makers in the region? In columns (3–6) of Table 5 we estimate
our enhanced model (see column 3) separately for young versus older cohorts. In col-
umns (3–4) the sample is split based on the median age of respondents in each country.
In columns (5–6) we split households based on whether they were younger or older than
24 in the year that the country last experienced a monetary crisis.22
Surprisingly, the results displayed in columns (3–6) of Table 5 show that the determi-
nants of deposit substitution hardly vary between cohorts. Monetary expectations and
the assessment of current policies seem to be just as important determinants of deposit
substitution among the old as they are among the young: the positive coefficients for
Depreciation (1-year) and negative coefficient for Trust in government are similar in terms of sta-
tistical significance and economic magnitude among young and older households. More-
over, network effects and crisis experience do not impact stronger on deposit substitution
for older households compared to younger households. The positive coefficient of Network
savings is almost identical across all four columns. Moreover, the positive coefficient of
Crisis experience does not differ significantly between young and old households.23
6. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Policymakers agree that the euroization of bank deposits in Eastern Europe hinders
effective monetary policy and increases financial sector fragility. However, they have di-
vergent views on how best to deal with deposit euroization in the region. Some empha-
size the need for ‘dedollarization’ and see a credible monetary policy regime as the path
to reducing deposit euroization. Others view deposit euroization as an inevitable heri-
tage of past financial crises, and thus embrace a full adoption of the Euro.
Our findings suggest that deposit euroization in Eastern Europe can be at least partly
tackled by prudent monetary policy—we show that the demand of households for for-
eign currency deposits partly driven by a distrust in the stability of their domestic cur-
rency. Monetary expectations, in turn, are related to household trust in the policies and
institutions of their country. Both can be influenced by policymakers. However, our
findings also suggest that prudent monetary policy may not be sufficient to achieve de-
euroization across the region. We confirm that the holding of foreign currency deposits
has become a ‘habit’ in the region and that the financial crises of the 1990s continue to
have a significant impact on monetary expectations and deposit substitution.
22 We define a year of monetary crisis as a year with CPI Inflation exceeding 20% (see Figure 5).
23 Chow tests do not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for Crisis experience are identical in columns
(4-5) and columns (6-7).
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Can policymakers deal with this hysteresis effect by implementing targeted policies
in the field of financial and economic education? Our results suggest that financial
education may contribute to de-euroization in countries with prudent monetary policy:
financially literate households are more likely to base their choice of currency on mone-
tary expectations.
Should policymakers just sit back and wait until the older generation which experi-
enced the 1990s crises no longer account for the majority of bank deposits? Our results
suggest that the euroization of bank deposits is unlikely to decline as the banking sector
becomes increasingly dominated by younger cohorts: the impact of network effects and
past crises on foreign currency deposit demand hardly differs across cohorts.
Could market-based demand side reforms–such as the development of local currency
capital markets–speed up the process of de-euroization? Our analysis suggests not as the
widespread use of the Euro among retail savers is not driven by a lack of local currency
investment opportunities: households in Central, Eastern and South eastern Europe
have broad access to a wide range of savings products in foreign and local currency.
Moreover, recent cross-country survey evidence shows that only a small share of house-
holds in Eastern (and Western) Europe participates in financial markets (European
Central Bank, 2013). We can therefore safely assume that the relevant investment spec-
trum for the overwhelming majority of households in the region are–the amply avail-
able–bank savings products.
Could financial regulation such as higher liquidity provisions for foreign currency
deposits or capital provisions for foreign currency loans foster the de-euroization of bank
deposits? Our evidence suggests that supply side interventions is unlikely to affect the
euroization of savings as the use of foreign currency deposits is largely demand driven.
We show that the observed share of foreign currency deposits among households with
a deposit account coincides with the stated preferences of these households for foreign
currency savings. Moreover, we show that foreign currency preferences and the relation
between monetary expectations and these preferences are similar among households
with and without deposit accounts. Thus, in accordance with Stix (2013) our results sug-
gest that supply side interventions which discourage the provision of foreign currency
savings products could encourage the use of other foreign currency denominated finan-
cial assets, like foreign currency cash, rather than local currency bank deposits.
Discussion
Sascha O. Becker
University of Warwick & UCLA (and CAGE, CEPR, CESIfo, Ifo and IZA)
This paper investigates a topic which has not received enough attention in (Western)
European policy circles, but is clearly of high importance in many eastern European
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countries: Euroization. In all eastern European non-Euro countries, large shares of the
population hold bank deposits in Euro-denominated accounts. This poses a major chal-
lenge for monetary policy in eastern Europe because those accounts are not directly
affected by the monetary policy instruments in the hands of the domestic central banks.
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the factors behind Euro bank
deposit holdings. The authors do a very careful job at constructing and exploring a rich
survey dataset, collected by the Austrian Central Bank. The paper is largely descriptive
in the sense that it does not exploit any natural or quasi-natural experiment, but the
richness of stylized facts makes it an important contribution for policymakers.
The survey covers respondents in ten countries in eastern Europe. The analysis shows
that many households distrust the stability of their domestic currency. This is largely not
only driven by their view of current policies and institutions, but also by households’
experiences of financial crises in the 1990s.
Furthermore, many households holding bank deposits in Euros (rightly or wrongly)
perceive this as the norm in their country. The authors discuss this point under the head-
ing of network effects. I am not sure that label is perfect fit, given the survey question
which asks respondents to state whether (or not) it is very common to hold foreign cur-
rency deposits. The authors are careful to note that what they call network effects are
not peer effects, whereby (actual) Euro bank deposit holdings of friends or business part-
ners influence Euro bank deposits of the survey respondents themselves. Also, the
authors point out that survey respondents may extrapolate from their own Euro bank
deposit holdings and state that this is what everyone does. So, they give two due caveats.
Their reason to classify these results as evidence of network effects is two-fold: first, the
risk of a local currency depreciation is higher if more other households hold their savings
in foreign currency. This point is well taken and–although not involving the direct inter-
action between ‘nodes’ in the network (as in the context of social networks), it is true that
the value of holding Euro bank deposits increases in the number of others doing the
same. This is pretty much a political economy argument whereby fiscal and monetary
policymakers will find it increasingly hard to ignore the preferences of those holding
Euro bank deposits. The second argument the authors give is that the utility derived
from using foreign currency for transactions increases with the share of other people
using foreign currency. Again, the point as such is well taken, but unless citizens also use
foreign currency in day-to-day interactions (as opposed to just storingcurrency in their
bank account), it does not strike me as evidence of network effects. Interestingly, the
authors find that households that live closer to the Euro area border are less likely to
prefer foreign currency deposits. If foreign currency deposits and day-to-day use of cur-
rency were positively correlated, one would have expected the opposite.
I would have been curious to see some more about the regional pattern of foreign
currency holdings. In the majority of the paper, the authors use fixed effects by region
and year to take out heterogeneity along the regional dimension. This is good and bad
at the same time. While allowing the authors to focus on household level variation
within regions, it also takes out potentially interesting insights into the regional drivers of
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foreign currency holdings. It would have been nice to link in region-specific variables,
from national census data, as additional controls.
Finally, in terms of policy implications, the authors suggest that while policymakers in
eastern Europe can try to build up trust in their policies and institutions, their hands are
tied whenever a large enough share of the population has already chosen to have foreign
currency holdings, because of the ‘network’ effect. This seems to only leave two exit
routes from euroization: regulation aimed at reducing the availability of foreign cur-
rency bank deposits or full-scale Euro adoption. The future will show.
Banu Demir
Bilkent University
Financial dollarization/euroization is an old but still-alive debate. The interest of
both researchers and policymakers in the topic arises primarily from the difficulties
associated with dollarization: dollarization may undermine the effectiveness of the
monetary policy and intensify the unwanted effects of exchange rate depreciation.
So far the literature has assessed the determinants and effects of dollarization mostly
at the aggregate level (e.g. Levy-Yeyati, 2006). The question of why households hold
foreign-exchange deposits has remained unanswered: Is it a habit, or a conscious deci-
sion? By answering this question, the authors make a valuable contribution to the
literature.
This paper uses household-level survey data from ten countries to study deposit euro-
ization in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. By providing the first household-
level analysis of dollarization, the paper tries to identify different motives behind finan-
cial euroization and draws policy conclusions. The results suggest that deposit euroiza-
tion is driven by a combination of people’s perception of macroeconomic outlook and
past experience. Because of the dependence of the decision on past experience, imple-
menting better macroeconomic policies could only partly reverse the euroization trend.
In particular, such policies might not remove the hysteresis factor. Given these robust
findings and resulting policy implications, the paper opens the black box of financial dol-
larization. Future work might usefully include extending the dataset to ask new and
more detailed questions about the drivers and consequences of financial dollarization at
the microlevel.
One interesting direction for future research might be to investigate the role of coun-
try heterogeneity in financial euroization. The region under consideration in the empiri-
cal analysis consists of countries with different characteristics. So one could be curious to
know how deposit euroization interacts with country-level characteristics. Currently, the
paper includes region-wave fixed effects to control for country heterogeneity.
Unearthing new stylized facts about deposit euroization would be possible if the survey
was repeated in the future.
Another interesting extension would be to use a policy change/quasi-natural experi-
ment to improve the identification of the effects estimated in the paper. For instance, the
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empirical findings reported in the paper suggest that euroization observed in the
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe is a combination of habit and conscious
choice. One could investigate whether there exists a policy change that happened
between two waves, which can be used to better identify the effect of current conditions
versus past experience.
Last but not least, the paper could be extended to include a more thorough analysis
of the potential effects of de-euroization under various potential policy responses. This
would have useful implications for the feasibility and desirability of such policies.
Panel discussion
Michalis Haliassos mentioned the measure of network effects used in the paper and
pointed out that it might be related to two elements. One is awareness and the other is
the extent of interaction with others about foreign deposits. He said it would be interest-
ing to distinguish the two empirically. Sergei Guriev said households may use foreign
currency deposits for hedging purposes and that it would be interesting to see this in the
data. Nicola Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln asked whether Euro accounts are available to everyone.
Refet Gu¨rkaynak wondered about the possibility of a prediction exercise. As a country
converges in its demographics and education to France or Germany, he asked how
euroization would change. Replying to the discussants’ comments, Helmut Stix clarified
that the survey is a representative one. In response to suggestions on having regional
information, he said that it would be great to have this information but it is hard to get
it so they choose to use regional dummies to control for this source of heterogeneity.
Information on foreign currency liabilities of households is available from the survey
and could be used to examine whether households are hedging corresponding currency
risk with foreign currency deposits Although no systematic data on supply side condi-
tions are available, anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign currency deposits are readily
available for depositors. Martin Brown clarified that the lack of cohort effects in the
extent of preferences for foreign currency savings suggests that euroization will not dis-
appear by demographic force alone.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at Economic Policy through Oxford Journals Online.
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APPENDIX A2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Deposit substitution
FC preference 14268 0.461 0.498 0 1
FC deposit share 2534 0.865 1.249 0 3
Monetary expectations and network effects
Depreciation (1-year) 15412 0.455 0.498 0 1
Exchange rate unpredictable (1-year) 14401 1.406 0.866 0 3
Inﬂation higher (1-year) 15148 0.413 0.492 0 1
Inﬂation unpredictable (1-year) 14872 1.364 0.931 0 3
Local currency unstable (5-year) 14125 1.201 0.669 0 2
EURO unstable (5-year) 13959 0.906 0.691 0 2
Network savings strong 13367 0.320 0.467 0 1
Network payments strong 14239 0.257 0.437 0 1
Neighbors network savings strong 15073 0.312 0.307 0 1
Neighbors network payment strong 15305 0.250 0.288 0 1
Crisis experience, policies and institutions
Crisis experience 13558 0.136 0.343 0 1
Crisis experience relatives 10322 0.125 0.331 0 1
Memory of inﬂation 13600 0.608 0.488 0 1
Trust in government 15177 0.239 0.426 0 1
Trust in police 15223 0.382 0.486 0 1
Cash used to avoid taxes 13331 0.628 0.483 0 1
Economy better (5 year) 14734 0.308 0.462 0 1
Financial sophistication and socioeconomic controls
Financial literacy 14895 1.766 1.052 0 3
Education 15313 0.757 0.429 0 1
Age 15412 46.111 15.187 19 98
Income high 15412 0.264 0.441 0 1
Income middle 15412 0.247 0.431 0 1
Income na 15412 0.206 0.404 0 1
Risk averse 14092 0.850 0.357 0 1
Self-employed 15367 0.072 0.259 0 1
Remittances 15266 0.079 0.270 0 1
LC loan 15412 0.132 0.339 0 1
FC loan 15412 0.117 0.322 0 1
Car 15412 0.606 0.489 0 1
Homeowner 15412 0.866 0.340 0 1
Distance to bank 14658 2.881 1.589 1 6
Distance to Euro Area <50 km 15412 0.219 0.413 0 1
Euro adoption 6878 0.530 0.499 0 1
Euro adoption don’t know 6878 0.292 0.455 0 1
Fin. situation bad 15136 0.676 0.468 0 1
Note: This table provides (unweighted) summary statistics for all variables in our analysis. Variable deﬁnitions are
provided in Appendix A1.
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